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Towards Promises Unfulfilled: Applying Sixteen Years of
Trade and Environmental Lessons to the Pending U.S.-
Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement
Travis A. Brooks*
I. INTRODUCTION
During the 2008 presidential campaign, Barack Obama expressed his
opposition to the current draft of the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement
(CTPA) saying, "whatever trade deals we negotiate while I'm President . .. will
have strong labor and environmental protections that we'll enforce."' This shift
from the fierce pro-trade stance of the prior administration is in some respects a
reflection of discontent in the labor and environmental movements that has
existed since the negotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) in the early 1990s. 2
At the heart of concern is the idea that U.S. free trade agreements emphasize
much about open markets but place too little emphasis on mitigating their social
and environmental costs.' Despite these qualms, U.S. free trade agreements now
reach well beyond North America, and have been signed and enacted with
seventeen nations across the globe.4 Until recently, all of the post-NAFTA trade
agreements have been signed without significantly altering the environmental
provisions included in each agreement.! In fact, those signed with far-off trading
partners in Chile, Jordan, Morocco, and Australia have weaker protections than
those that accompany NAFTA.6
* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May, 2011. B.A., Political
Science, the Colorado College, 2006.
1. Senator Barack Obama, Remarks for Senator Barack Obama: AFL-CIO, (Apr. 02, 2008) (transcript
available at http://www.barackobama.com/2008/04/02/remarks_for senatorbarack_oba_3.php).
2. See Peter Newell, Civil Society Participation in Trade Policy-Making in Latin America; the Case of
the Environmental Movement, in HANDBOOK ON TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 171,172-75 (Kevin P.
Gallagher ed., 2008); Jim Naureckas, Happily Ever NAFTA?, ExTRA!, (Oct. 1993), http://www.fair.org/index.
php?page=1535.
3. See Newell, supra note 2, at 173 (Describing that many social and environmental groups in the period
before NAFTA claimed that NAFTA would accelerate social and environmental problems in North America,
and that some of these groups wanted a new set of social and environmental rules in the agreement).
4. Free Trade Agreements, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements (last visited Oct. 10, 2010) [hereinafter Free Trade Agreements].
5. See Chris Wold, Evaluating Nafta and the Commission for Environmental Cooperation: Lessons for
Integrating Trade and Environment in Free Trade Agreements, 28 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 201, 251 (2008).
6. Free trade agreements signed with Chile, Morocco, Jordan, and Australia all exclude the citizen
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Since the outset of the NAFTA debate in the 1990s, free trade advocates
have answered critics by predicting that open markets would bring to the
developing world the same heightened environmental standards associated with
wealthier countries as trade boosted standards of living. Unfortunately, this
correlation has not materialized.' Most Mexicans are worse off since NAFTA
came into effect, with national income rising a modest one percent annually,
along with increased poverty, falling wages, and continued levels of high income
disparity.9 At the same time, the cost of environmental degradation in the country
has reached a troubling ten percent of Mexico's gross domestic product (GDP).'o
This coincides with increased-pollution emissions and slow income growth since
NAFTA came into effect."
Nonetheless, dire predictions that free trade agreements would create
pollution havens for multinational corporations seeking weaker environmental
standards have also not materialized. 2 For example, data does not show
movement by heavy polluters from outside countries into Mexico in search of lax
environmental regulations after NAFTA was enacted. 3 Although there is little
evidence that free trade agreements have created what are called "competition
effects," which are the result of a race to reduce environmental protections to
encourage foreign investment, these agreements certainly have exacerbated
existing problems caused by weak environmental institutions in the developing
world. 14 Thus, instead of causing "competition effects," free trade agreements
have caused what are called negative "scale effects."
"Scale effects" can be described as the effects of trade on the environment
that result from an increased overall scale of economic activity resulting from
free trade." In countries without sufficient regulatory infrastructure to cope with
the potential damaging environmental effects of increased economic activity, this
submission process explained later in Parts V-VI as an enforcement mechanism. Id. at 237.
7. Kevin P. Gallagher, Introduction: International Trade and the Environment, in HANDBOOK ON TRADE
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1, 2-4 (Kevin P. Gallagher ed., 2008).
8. Id. at 10-11.
9. Id. at 12; Sandra Polanski, Mexican Employment and Income a Decade After NAFTA, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE, 169 (Feb. 25, 2004), http://www.camegieendowment.org/pdf/files/
canadasenatebrief.pdf.
10. Gallagher, supra note 7, at 12.
I1. Jody W. Lipford & Bruce Yandle, NAF7A, Environmental Kuznets Curves, and Mexico's Progress,
GLOBAL ECONOMY JOURNAL, 5 (2010), http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1656&context
=gej.
12. See James K. Boyce, Globalization and the Environment: Convergence or Divergence?, in
HANDBOOK ON TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 97, 111 (Kevin P. Gallagher ed., 2008); Gallagher, supra note
7, at I1.
13. See Lipford & Yandle, supra note 11, at 4.
14. GALLAGHER, supra note 7, at 10-11.
15. Wold, supra note 5, at 205, 251; see Lipford & Yandle, supra note 11, at 4.
16. INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEv., ENV'T AND TRADE: A HANDBOOK 46-47 (2nd ed. 2005),
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/envirotrade-handbook_2005.pdf [hereinafter Environment and Trade].
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leads to accelerating levels of environmental degradation. 7 Under existing free
trade agreements, studies have shown these negative "scale effects" on the
environment have been much more serious than "competition effects."08
Whatever language is included in the final version of the CTPA should address
this reality.
Along with the Panama Trade Promotion Agreement and the South Korea
Free Trade Agreement, the CTPA is currently under review of Congress and the
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.' This is a result of political changes in
the U.S. that brought with them a re-examination of U.S. free trade policies in
general.20
The pending status of the CTPA at a time when America's approach to new
trade agreements is being re-examined, make it a model of how the
environmental lessons learned in the sixteen years since NAFTA went into effect
can be applied to a new trade agreement. Moreover, Colombia's extraordinarily
rich but threatened biodiversity make the CTPA a potential model of how
improvements can be made to new U.S. free trade agreements when the
environmental and ecological stakes are especially high.2'
To understand what changes should be made to the CTPA, it is helpful to
look at the experiences under free trade agreements between the U.S. and other
Latin American nations that are already in place. This is especially true because
the environmental provisions of all of the free trade agreements signed between
the U.S. and Latin America since NAFTA are based on the same basic structure
as the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), the
environmental side agreement to NAFTA.2 2 With an eye towards improving the
CTPA, this comment will look at the NAAEC, (enacted in 1993 between the
U.S., Canada, and Mexico), the Dominican Republic-Central America Free
Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) (signed between the U.S., the Dominican
Republic, Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua in
17. Id.; Wold, supra note 5, at 224-25.
18. Wold, supra note 5, at 224-25.
19. Free Trade Agreements, supra note 4; Panama Trade Promotion Agreement, OFFICE OF THE U.S.
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/panama-tpa (last visited
Oct. 10, 2010); Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta (last visited Oct. 10, 2010); Colombia
FTA, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/colombia-fta (last visited Oct. 29, 2010).
20. See Joseph J. Schatz, Free Trade Returns to the Table, CQ POLITICS (Apr. 20, 2009, 8:21 PM),
http://www.greenchange.org/article.php?id=4296.
21. Colombia: Environmental Profile, MONGABAY, http://rainforests.mongabay.com/20colombia.htm
(last updated Feb. 6, 2006) [hereinafter Colombia Profile] (describing Colombia's biodiversity).
22. See Wold, supra note 5, at 251 (asserting that each free trade agreement enacted after NAFIA has
been built on the environmental provisions of the NAAEC); North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation, done Sept. 8-Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter NAAEC].
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2004), as well as the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA) (signed
between the U.S. and Peru in 2007). 23
Not only are these trade agreements all built on the environmental provisions
of the NAAEC, but unlike trade agreements signed with more far-off trading
partners, the NAAEC, DR-CAFTA, PTPA, and the current draft of the CTPA all
contain the citizen submission process, which will be examined later in this
24
comment. Additionally, all of these agreements were signed between Latin
American nations that the International Monetary Fund describes as "emerging"
or "developing," and the U.S., a major and much more advanced economy to the
21
north.
What is still unclear is whether any changes will be made to the
environmental provisions of the CTPA. The current language of Chapter 18 in
the agreement already reflects renegotiated terms laid out by the U.S. House
Ways and Means Committee in 2007.26 Under these terms, all of the CTPA's
environmental provisions (including seven multinational environmental treaties
added to the agreement) are theoretically strengthened because they are subject to
the binding dispute settlement mechanism used for all other major provisions of
27the trade agreement.
The PTPA, signed in the last days of the Bush administration contains even
stronger protections.28 In particular, the PTPA includes an annex addressing
threatened Peruvian forest sectors. 29 By including this annex, the PTPA breaks
23. NAAEC, supra note 22, pmbl; Cafta-DR (Dominican Republic-Central America FTA), OFFICE OF
THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-
dominican-republic-central-america-fta (last visited Jan. 30, 2010) [hereinafter Cafta-DR]; Peru Trade
Promotion Agreement, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-tpa (last visited Jan. 30, 2010).
24. Wold, supra note 5, at 237 (explaining that only the free trade agreements with Colombia, Panama,
and Peru contain the citizen submission process, and not those signed with Australia, Chile, Jordan, and
Morocco).
25. World Economic Outlook: Database - WEO Groups and Aggregates Information, INT'L MONETARY
FUND (Apr. 2010), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/weodata/groups.htm#oem; see The World
Factbook: Country Comparison GDP, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2011) (illustrating the much
larger size of the U.S. economy in compared to all of the Latin American nations in these agreements).
26. See Peru & Panama FTA Changes, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS (May 10, 2007), available at http://www.cpath.org/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/2007
newtrade-policy-details5-10-07.pdf [hereinafter WAYS AND MEANS]; United States-Colombia Trade
Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Colom., ch. 18, art. 18.12(6), Annex 18.2, signed by Colombia and the United
States Nov. 22, 2006, (pending Congressional approval), available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default
/files/uploads/agreements/fta/colombia/assetupload file644_10192.pdf [hereinafter CTPA] (including
language making the Agreement's environmental provisions subject to the binding dispute mechanisms used for
other aspects of the agreement).
27. WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 26; CTPA, supra note 26, art. 18.12(6).
28. See United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Peru, Apr. 12, 2006, 121 Stat. 1455,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/perulassetupload-file953_9541.pdf
[hereinafter PTPA]; Wold, supra note 5, at 246-47.
29. PTPA, supra note 28, Annex 18.3.4.
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somewhat from the "competition effects" centered model of the NAAEC, and
other post NAFTA trade agreements by laying out problem specific enforcement
and institution building mechanisms.o
While the renegotiated terms of the CTPA are promising, the current draft of
the CTPA still contains many of the shortcomings from DR-CAFTA without
incorporating a country-specific approach like that included in the PTPA.31 As in
DR-CAFTA, the NAAEC, and the PTPA, the citizen submission process still
functions as a core enforcement mechanism of the CTPA.32 Described below, this
process has had a positive impact, but a limited one.33 It is also argued that the
focus by the CTPA and other U.S. free trade agreements on enforcement
mechanisms misses the mark by concentrating on competition effects and not on
the scale effects shown to be worsened by free trade. 4
Although they will not solve the host of problems facing Colombia,
improvements to the environmental provisions of the CTPA are necessary to
allow a correlation between liberalized trade and enhanced environmental quality
initially promised by free trade advocates. This Comment will provide a brief
description of the lengthy system of environmental codes and constitutional
environmental rights in Colombia. It will then explain that in reality, these laws
are under enforced and not guaranteed. The result is that the world's second most
biologically diverse nation faces ongoing and increasing environmental
degradation, a fact to which the final version of the CTPA must be sensitive.35 An
analysis of the current draft of the CTPA and an examination of the citizen
submission process will follow. This core provision will be assessed by looking
at nine submissions that have arisen under the NAAEC and the DR-CAFTA.
Because it significantly breaks from the mold of prior free trade agreements,
this Comment will then analyze the Annex on Forest Sector Governance to the
PTPA. A brief analysis of the "resource curse" theory will follow because it
directly challenges the idea of an automatic correlation between free trade and
improved environmental standards. All of these factors will then be applied to the
pending agreement with Colombia to determine where improvements might be
made. Ultimately, it will be argued that the CTPA should embrace a wider
application of the problem specific approach of the PTPA, and seek to enhance
the institutions that can study and prevent the potential harm arising from
increased trade related development and private U.S. investment. This will likely
30. Wold, supra note 5, at 251.
31. Id. at 237-38; see CTPA, supra note 26, art.18.3 (adding no additional provisions particular to
Colombia); PTPA, supra note 28, Annex 18.3.4 (setting forth additional provisions with respect to forest sector
governance particular to Peru).
32. Wold, supra note 5, at 237.
33. See infra Parts V-VI.
34. See Wold, supra note 5, at 205-06.
35. See Colombia Profile, supra note 21.
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require more investment towards environmental protection than has been
allocated under prior U.S. free trade agreements with Latin America.
II. A UNIQUE COMMITMENT UNFULFILLED: COLOMBIA'S NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
With its long history of civil war and cocaine exportation, it may be
surprising that Colombia has some of the most expansive and modem
environmental laws in the world.36 In 1974 Colombia passed the National
Renewable Resources and Environmental Code, one of the first comprehensive
environmental regimes to be enacted worldwide." Decades later in 1993, the
country took steps to boost enforcement of these laws by establishing a Ministry
of the Environment and fifteen Corporaciones Autonomas Regionales singularly
tasked with addressing environmental issues.3 ' These codes coincide with the
Colombian Constitution of 1991 that devotes twenty-three articles to
environmental protection, including a right for all Colombian citizens to enjoy a
healthy environment and a communal right to participate in decisions that affect
it.39 Constitutional provisions also require the government to manage natural
resources in a manner that guarantees sustainable development and
conservation. 0
On the national level, Colombian courts have asserted themselves, enforcing
these laws in the face of outside political pressure. For example, a constitutional
tribunal recently struck down the controversial "General Forestry Law," a joint
effort by the Uribe administration of Columbia and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) to privatize Colombian forests for logging
on communal indigenous lands.4 1 Many feared the plan would allow lumber
companies to coerce weakly organized indigenous communities into opening up
their communal forest land to industrial-scale logging without requiring
42
environmental permits. By allowing this plan to go forward without establishing
36. See Adam B. Kushner, The Truth About Plan Colombia, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 3, 2009), http://www.
newsweek.com/2009/01/02/the-truth-about-plan-colombia.html; Interim Environmental Review: U.S.-Andean
Free Trade Agreement, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 5-6 (Feb. 2005), http://www.ustr.gov/
sites/default/files/Interim-Environmental-Review.pdf [hereinafter Interim Review].
37. Id. at 5.
38. Id. at 6.
39. CONsTrrUCI6N POLITICA DE COLOMBIA [c.P.] art. 79.
40. Id. art. 80.
41. President Alvaro Uribe Velez was the president of Colombia from 2002 until August of 2010.
Profile: Alvaro Uribe Velez, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilamericas/3214685.stm (last updated Mar.
29, 2010); La Corte Constitucional Declara Inexequible la Ley Forestal [The Constitutional Court Declared the
Forest Law Unconstitutional], GRUPO SEMILLAS, http://www.semillas.org.co/sitio.shtml?apc=I1%20-%20-
%20&x=20155467 (last visited Dec. 25, 2009) [hereinafter La Corte]; see generally Sonia Parra, Environment-
Colombia: Controversy over Forestry Law Simmers On, INTER PRESS SERV. (Oct. 5, 2006), http://ipsnews.
net/news.asp?idnews=35002.
42. Parra, supra note 41.
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regulations to ensure it occurred sustainably, many worried environmental harm
would intensify in areas already suffering heavily from illegal logging.43
Despite strong pressure by the Uribe government and the timber industry, the
Colombian Constitutional Court deemed the plan unconstitutional because it
failed to allow participation by indigenous communities in crafting the law."
Backed by various sectors of Colombian civil society, the success of this lawsuit
displays the potential for effective protection of constitutional rights in the face
of strong industry pressure. 5 More commonly however, hard realities in the
country mean that the lofty ideas laid out in Colombia's codes and Constitution
have not yet come to fruition.
III. THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENTAL SITUATION IN COLOMBIA
In discussing the environmental situation in Colombia, it is important first to
address the armed conflict between the national government and two groups:
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation
46Army (ENL). An estimated 40,000 deaths have occurred since 1990 as a result
of this conflict and three million people have been displaced internally.47
Although former President Uribe made strides to dampen this conflict, continued
rebel presence in rural areas is an obvious and substantial hindrance to the rule of
law throughout the country.48
A government that does not have control over all of its territory will be
unable to enforce its environmental laws in areas outside of its reach. Moreover,
many of those fighting the Colombian government are heavily involved in the
cocaine trade which is responsible for much of Colombia's unregulated loss of
49forest cover. U.S. efforts to combat the coca trade (largely based on aerial
fumigation), have had further substantially harmful effects on native vegetation
without actually reducing the amount of cocaine entering the U.S.o Therefore,
the environmental measures under the CTPA should coincide with continued
U.S. support aimed at ending the civil conflict in Colombia so that environmental
laws can be enforced and natural resources can be protected throughout the
country. Ideally, the U.S. should also adjust its efforts at combating cocaine in
43. Id.
44. La Corte, supra note 41.
45. Id.
46. Armed Conflicts Report: Colombia, PROJECT PLOUGHSHARES (Jan. 2010), http://www.ploughshares.
calibraries/ACRText/ACR-Colombia.html [hereinafter PLOUGHSHARES].
47. Id.
48. See Q&A: Colombia's Civil Conflict, BBC NEWS (Dec. 23, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hil1738963.stm.
49. Id. (indicating that many of those fighting the Colombian government are involved in the illegal drug
trade); Colombia Profile, supra note 21.
50. Colombia Profile, supra note 21 (describing coca's impact on the environment, and also the U.S.'
environmentally destructive but futile efforts to eradicate coca plants).
345
2011 / Towards Promises Unfulfilled
ways that are less ecologically destructive. These points are all the more
important when looking to the vast ecological and natural resource wealth worth
protecting in the country.
These resources form an impressive part of the Colombian landscape. From
an ecological standpoint, Colombia is the second most biologically diverse
country in the world." For example, a 1999 report covering only seventy percent
of the country counted 26,000 species of plants. Colombia is rich in other
natural resources as well, with the fourth largest overall flow of rivers relative to
its size, some of the world's most extensive deposits of oil, coal, and significant
deposits of natural gas and other valuable minerals." Although these resources
are theoretically protected by comprehensive and modem environmental
regulations, political realities in the country make them difficult to enforce. This
is mostly due to problems common in the developing world, with insufficient
budgets from a weak tax base, the ongoing civil conflict mentioned above, and
sparse governmental presence in rural areas making enforcement difficult.
Inadequate enforcement in the face of shifting environmental pressures has
contributed to a thirty percent loss in Colombia's biodiversity in recent decades.56
Deforestation is especially troubling, accounting for a loss of a third of
Colombia's vegetative cover since the 1960s and five percent of worldwide
deforestation during the 1980s.17 The scourge of water pollution in the country's
many rivers is also substantial, with ninety-five percent of Colombian cities
pumping untreated sewage directly into their waters.
The role of resource development and exploitation in this situation is
obvious. Every year approximately 200,000 hectares of forest are lost as a result
of large and small scale farming, logging, mining, and energy and infrastructure
development. Pacific coast rainforests are especially threatened by gold mining
and palm oil extraction.60 According to a study from the mid-nineties, gold
mining alone contributed to an estimated loss of 80,000 hectares of forest.6'
Government led development efforts add to the pressure on Colombia's
environment. For example, in 1992 the national government laid out an
ambitious plan to develop and industrialize the Pacific coastal region. The Plan
51. Id.
52. Interim Review, supra note 36, at 6.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 8.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 7.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Colombia Profile, supra note 21.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Rainforest Indians Threatened, SURVIVAL INT'L (1998), http://assets.survivalintemational.org/
static/files/related_material/46_63_145_emberabg.pdf.
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Pacifico sought to facilitate increased resource extraction from the area, creating
a cross-country highway, oil pipeline, and canal.63 Stemming from its wealth of
valuable mineral, timber (accounting for sixty percent of timber in the country),
and oil resources, environmental pressures will only increase along the Pacific
coast as development efforts continue."
IV. THE U.S.-COLOMBIA TRADE PROMOTION AGREEMENT
ENTERS THE PICTURE
The potential for the CTPA to exacerbate the problems listed above is
highlighted by the large role U.S. exports already play in the Colombian
economy.6' The U.S. is easily the largest export partner for Colombia, accounting
for about thirty-two percent of gross exports in 20096 and around nine percent of
the country's gross domestic product (GDP).6 ' Reflecting this relationship, the
CTPA is the culmination of twenty years of trade arrangements with the U.S.6 1
Extending these prior agreements that allowed duty free access to U.S. markets
for most Colombian exports, the CTPA will increase U.S. access to trade and
investment protections in Colombia and eliminate duties on eighty percent of
69U.S. consumer and industrial goods.
Following the model of DR-CAFTA, the PTPA, and other post-NAFTA
trade agreements, environmental enforcement provisions of the CTPA are placed
directly in the agreement in Chapter 18.70 Like the language in the NAAEC and
Chapter 17 of DR-CAFTA," Chapter 18 requires both Colombia and the United
States to adhere to existing national environmental regulations and laws in
following the agreement.72 The CTPA deems it, "inappropriate to encourage trade
63. Id.
64. Lina Bentancourt, Plan Pacifico in the Choco Region of Colombia, THE MANDALA PROJECTS: TED
CASE STUDIES (June 1998), http://wwwl.american.edulted/TED/all.html#Junl998 (follow "494 PACIFICO
West Colombia Development: Plan Pacifico in the Choco Region of Colombia, by Lina Bentancourt").
65. See The World Factbook: Columbia economy, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/co.html (last updated Feb. 11, 2011).
66. Id.
67. Interim Review, supra note 36, at 44.
68. Daniel Griswold & Juan Carlos Hidalgo, A U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Strengthening
Democracy and Progress in Latin America, THE CATO INSTITUTE: CTR FOR TRADE POLICY STUDIES (Feb. 6,
2008), http://www.freetrade.org/node/839.
69. Id.
70. CTPA, supra note 26, art. 18.3. Article 10.11 of the agreement also includes language that none of
the investment protections in the agreement should be construed to limit either government from ensuring that
investment activity occurs in a manner that is "sensitive to environmental concerns. Id. art. 10.11.
71. Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement ch. 17, art 17.5, Aug. 2,
2005, 119 Stat. 462, http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/caftalasset-upload-file9
.3937.pdf [hereinafter DRCAFTA].
72. The length of Chapter 18 and the inclusion of like language in U.S. trade agreements with Latin
America since NAFTA does warrant some praise. Most contemporary trade agreements such as the Mercado
Comdn del Sur in South America (MERCOSUR) and other bilateral agreements rarely contain more than a brief
347
2011 / Towards Promises Unfulfilled
or investment by weakening or reducing the protections afforded in their
respective environmental laws."" This mirrors similar language in the NAAEC
meant to address a fear that parties to free trade agreements will compete for
foreign investment by derogating from their environmental laws.74
A country has met the enforcement requirements of the agreement so long as
their course of action and discretion "reflects a reasonable, articulable, bona fide
exercise of such discretion, or results from a reasonable, articulable, bona fide
decision regarding the allocation of such resources."" Each nation must also
provide for "appropriate and effective" sanctions and remedies for internal
violations of their environmental laws and allow citizens to request an
investigation of any alleged violations of national environmental laws.
From an institutional standpoint, Chapter 18 sets up an Environmental
Affairs Council (EAC) where each party designates a senior level environmental
official to oversee environmental compliance under the agreement. 7 Like other
post-NAFTA agreements, the EAC is required to create an Environmental
Cooperation Agreement (ECA) that lays out the environmental guidelines to be
followed and a working plan to address environmental issues in the signing
-78
nations.
While an ECA has yet to be drafted for the CTPA, the ECA created for DR-
CAFTA suggests that the work guidelines are initially very general and do not
address the particular environmental concerns for each country. 79 For example,
the ECA under DR-CAFTA contains general language that seeks exchanges of
professionals and delegations to strengthen the environmental policies under the
agreement."o Under the CPTA, the Environmental Cooperation Agreement (ECA)
is also required to set up an Environmental Cooperation Commission (ECC)."
ECCs from prior agreements are composed of government representatives from
each country and are responsible for developing cooperative environmental work
programs aimed at environmental protection.82
Under DR-CAFTA, the ECC is tasked with general initiatives such as
promoting each country's environmental management systems; developing
statement promoting sustainability and environmental protection. See Dale Colyer, Environmental Provisions in
Trade Agreements, WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY, 8-9, (2004), http://ageconsearch.umn.edulbitstream/19103/1/
cpO4coO2.pdf (analyzing the depth and efficacy of environmental provisions in contemporary trade
agreements).
73. CTPA, supra note 26, art. 18.3(2).
74. See Wold, supra note 5, at 209,215.
75. CTPA, supra note 26, art. 18.3(1)(b)(i).
76. Id. art. 18.4.
77. Id. art. 18.6(1).
78. DRCAFTA, supra note 71, art. 17.5; PTPA, supra note 28, art. 18.6; CTPA, supra note 26, art. 18.6.
79. Wold, supra note 5, at 241.
80. Id.
81. CTPA, supra note 26, art. 18.6(2)(d).
82. DRCAFTA, supra note 71, art. 17.5(1), 17.9(4); PTPA, supra note 28, art. 18.6(1), 18.6(2)(d).
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incentives for environmental protections; conserving and managing shared,
migratory and endangered species; and building capacity to promote public
participation." The EAC then oversees the implementation of the environmental
provisions of the agreement, providing periodic reports to the U.S. Free Trade
Commission (FTC) and allowing for public comment and participation in its
work through various mechanisms.
The language of CTPA retreats from the NAAEC by hindering the
independence of its environmental institutions. First of all, like the DR-CAFTA
and the PTPA, the CTPA curtails the responsibilities of the independent
secretariat which is a constituent body to the CEC (the NAAEC's environmental
commission) under NAFTA or the ECAs under subsequent trade agreements."
The NAAEC Secretariat has the power to initiate reports related to the
environmental effects of trade, an independent capability that has proven "very
valuable" to the understanding of particular environmental effects relating to the
trading relationship. 6 Unfortunately, the CTPA, PTPA and DR-CAFTA, limit
these responsibilities to investigating citizen submissions, outlined later in this
comment." This eliminates an important independent voice in understanding the
effects of trade and analyzing the success of implementing the Environmental
Cooperation Agreement (ECA) on a broader scale.
Another omission in the CTPA is its failure to create a neutral and
independent body to oversee environmental issues and monitor citizen
complaints under the citizen submission process." Under NAFTA, the NAAEC
creates an intermediary called the Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC),
meant to provide neutral advice to the CEC on environmental issues.90 The
committee is staffed by fifteen citizen volunteers selected by each country.1
Through public outreach, JPAC provides various suggestions to the CEC about
how to improve environmental protection under the trade agreement.92
83. One positive development under DR-CAFTA is that the ECA is funded by a significantly higher
budget than the $9 million budget for the CEC under the NAAEC, with funding set at $18.5 and $19.3 for 2006
and 2007 respectively. The U.S. currently provides this funding and hopefully will continue this increased
commitment to the ECA under the CTPA. Wold, supra note 5, at 242; Environmental Cooperation Agreement
(ECA-DR-CA-USA) Work Plan, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE- BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INT'L ENV'T AND Scs.
AFFAIRS (July 17, 2006), http://www.state.gov/g/oes/env/trade/caftadr/81947.htm; see Clare Ribando, DR-
CAFTA: Regional Issues, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 3 (July 8, 2005), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/
organization/50155.pdf.
84. CTPA, supra note 26, art 18.6(b)-(c)(i).
85. Wold, supra note 5, at 206.
86. See id. at 232-33.
87. Id. at 206; CTPA, supra note 26, art. 18.8(1), 18.9(1); PTPA, supra note 28, art. 18.8(1), 18.9(1).
88. Wold, supra note 5, at 206.
89. Id. at 205-06.
90. Id. at 216, 238.
91. Id. at 216.
92. See MARK PAQUIN, KAREL MAYRAND & CARLA SBERT, UNISFERA INT'L CTR, JPAC AND PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION IN THE ACTlVITIES OF THE COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION OF NORTH
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As an independent advisory committee, the JPAC serves an important
oversight function in maintaining the independence of the CEC and the
Secretariat." This is particularly true as it develops environmental initiatives and
handles reporting and enforcement under the citizen submission process.94 By not
including the Secretariat's independent reporting capabilities or an equivalent to
the JPAC, the CTPA weakens the institutional independence of its environmental
protections (including the citizen submission process) and limits the amount of
public oversight it allows.95
V. THE CITIZEN SUBMISSION PROCESS
The citizen submission process within Chapter 18 of CTPA is an important
enforcement tool. This is especially true because the other types of enforcement
provisions (included in the dispute settlement portion) of the CTPA have never
been utilized under any prior U.S. free trade agreement. 96 Nonetheless, because of
structural flaws mentioned above, the fact that a successful claim only creates a
factual report and a recommendation that is not effectively binding, means that
the usefulness of the citizen submission process is limited.
Under the citizen submission provision in Article 18.8 of the CTPA, a citizen
of Colombia has the right to file a submission asserting that either the U.S. or
Colombia is failing to effectively enforce its environmental laws.97 U.S. citizens
must file complaints against the United States under the already existing citizen
submission framework created under the NAAEC.' Each country is also
responsible for appointing a secretariat or other appropriate body to accept these
submissions." Various requirements must be met before the Secretariat can
consider a submission.'" Each submission must clearly identify the person
making the submission, and must provide sufficient information to allow a
review of the submission, including any documentary evidence upon which the
submission is based."o' The submission must also indicate specifically what law
the nation is failing to enforce and must seem to promote enforcement rather than
harass industry. 02 Before filing the submission, the filer must indicate that the
AMERICA (CEC): DISCusSION PAPER 5-7 (2003), http://unisfera.org/IMG/pdf/Unisfera_-_CECPublic_
Participation.pdf.
93. Wold, supra note 5, at 238.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 237-38.
96. Wold, supra note 5, 236; CTPA, supra note 26, art. 18.12(6).
97. CTPA, supra note 26, art. 18.8(1), (3).
98. Id. art. 18.8(3).
99. Id. art. 18.8(1), 18.8(1) n. 3.
100. Id. art. 18.8(2).
101. Id. art. 18.8(2)(a)-(c).
102. Id. art. 18.8(2)(c)-(d).
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matter has already been communicated in writing to the relevant national
authorities and indicate any response he or she may have received.103
Once the Secretariat determines that the requirements are met, it determines
whether the submission merits a request for a response from the nation alleged to
have failed enforcing its laws." In making this determination, the secretariat
must consider enumerated guidelines.'o These include: whether the submission is
frivolous or alleges actual harm to the submitter; whether the submission alone or
in concert with other submissions advances the goals of the Environmental
Cooperation Agreement (ECA) and Chapter 18; whether private remedies under
national law are available and have been pursued; and whether the submission is
drawn exclusively from mass media reports.'" If under these guidelines the
secretariat determines that a request is warranted, it will send the submission and
any corresponding documentation to the defendant nation.'0 Within forty-five
days (or within sixty days in exceptional circumstances), the defendant must
respond and describe whether the issue is subject to any national judicial or
administrative proceeding; whether private remedies are available to the
complainants in connection to the issue; or give any information concerning
relevant capacity building activities under the ECA meant to improve its
environmental enforcement. 0 8
After a response is received from the defendant nation, the Secretariat must
decide whether the submission and corresponding response warrants the
development of a factual record.'9 The secretariat must then inform the
Environmental Affairs Council (EAC) that a factual record is warranted and its
reasons for so concluding."o If any member of the EAC instructs it to do so, the
secretariat then prepares the factual record."' If the Secretariat prepares a factual
record, the Secretariat is to review any information that has been offered by a
Party, and can supplement the record with any relevant technical, scientific, or
other information."2 At this point, the Secretariat submits a final factual record to
the EAC and either party can provide comments on the accuracy of the record
that is to be incorporated."' If instructed to by any member of the EAC, the
secretariat is to make the final factual record publicly available within sixty days
103. Id. art. 18.8(2)(e).
104. Id. art. 18.8(4).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. CTPA, supra note 26, art. 18.8(4).
108. Id. art. 18.8(5).
109. Id. art. 18.9(1).
110. Id. art. 18.9(1).
111. Id. art. 18.9(2). This is an area where the citizen submission process has been strengthened after the
NAAEC, which requires the CEC to vote for the factual record with a two-thirds majority. See NAAEC, supra
note 22, art. 15.2.
112. CTPA, supra note 26, art. 18.9(4).
113. Id. art. 18.9(5)-(6).
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after its submission."4 The EAC then considers the factual record in light of the
environmental provisions of Chapter 18, and the yet to be agreed upon ECA."' It
then provides recommendations to the Environmental Cooperation Commission
(ECC), including recommendations for the improvement of a country's
environmental enforcement."'6
An aspect where the CTPA (and PTPA) improves upon the citizen
submission process as it exists in the NAAEC is that the CTPA requires the EAC
to conduct a review regarding the implementation of its recommendations five
years after a factual record is completed."' Under the NAAEC, there is no
language requiring recommendations or a secondary review after a successful
submission."" By making recommendations and requiring a review of their
implementation, the citizen submission process addresses some of the
toothlessness of the process in the NAAEC explained below.
VI. IS THE CITIZEN SUBMISSION PROCESS EFFECTIVE?: LESSONS FROM MEXICO
AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
As in prior trade agreements, the process outlined above remains a core
provision of the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement."' This section will
analyze the outcome of several submissions under NAFTA and DR-CAFTA to
determine their effectiveness as an enforcement tool. Out of all the developing
nations whose trade agreements incorporate the citizen submission process,
Mexico has the longest experience under the citizen submission provisions,
therefore it is important to analyze the experience there. Likewise, because DR-
CAFTA extended the citizen submission process to several Latin American
nations,120 it is important to analyze the submissions under that agreement.
114. Id. art. 18.9(7).
115. Id. art. 18.9(8).
116. Id.
117. Compare id. art. 18.9(9), and PFPA, supra note 28, art. 18.9(9) (requiring a review of the Party's
implementation of the EAC's original recommendations five years later), with NAAEC, supra note 22, art. 14.3
(containing no such language).
118. NAAEC, supra note 22, art. 14.3.
119. CTPA, supra note 26, art. 18.9(9); Wold, supra note 5, at 237.
120. Cafta-DR, supra note 23.
121. Compare Registry of Citizen Submissions 2007, SECRETARIAT FOR ENVTL. MATTERS [SEMI,
http://www.tusaa.org/index.php?option=com-content&view
=category&layout=blog&id=37&Itemid=96&lang=us# (last visited Oct. 1, 2010), with Registry of Citizen
Submissions 2008, SECRETARIAT FOR ENVTL. MATTERS [SEMI, http://www.tusaa.org/index.php?option
=comcontent&view=category&layout=blog&id=38&Itemid=196&lang=us (last visited Oct. 1, 2010)
[hereinafter Submission Registry 2008], and Registry of Citizen Submissions 2009), SECRETARIAT FOR ENVTL
MATTERS [SEMI, http://www.tusaa.org/index.php?option-com-content&view=category&layout= blog&id=39
&Itemid=197&lang=us (last visited Oct. 1, 2010), and Registry of Citizen Submissions 2010, SECRETARIAT FOR
ENVTL. MATTERS [SEMI, http://www.tusaa.org/index.php?option=com-content&view=category&layout
=blog&id=40&Itemid=198&lang=us (last visited Oct. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Submission Registry 2010] (The
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Because only one submission against the Dominican Republic has reached the
factual record stage at the time of writing, the experience under DR-CAFTA is
difficult to analyze on a wide scale."' However, with six citizen submissions
from 2010 under active review by the Secretariat, this may soon change.122
When it was incorporated into the NAAEC, the citizen submission process
was heralded as a significant step towards the democratization and transparency
of international trade and environmental agreements.'2  Under the NAAEC and
DR-CAFTA, the process serves an important purpose, allowing for citizens and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to publicize development that harms or
will harm the environment in the future. 2 4 This is especially true in Mexico
which has the highest number of citizen submissions but no provision under
national law to challenge future environmental damage.125
From 1995 until the time of writing, thirty-eight submissions have been filed
against Mexico, equal to the number of submissions filed against Canada and the
United States combined.'26 Most of these submissions were terminated for failing
to meet the submission requirements for a factual finding, as outlined above.27
To date, seven Mexican submissions have led to factual records, and some are
still under review.128
current status of the 2007 citizen submission is "preparing factual record" while no submitted cases from 2008-
2010 have reached that stage).
121. Compare Registry of Citizen Submissions 2007, SECRETARIAT FOR ENVTL. MATTERS [SEM],
http://www.tusaa.org/index.php?option=com_content&view
=category&layout=blog&id=37&Itemid=96&Iang=us# (last visited Oct. 1, 2010), with Registry of Citizen
Submissions 2008, SECRETARIAT FOR ENVTL. MATTERS [SEM], http://www.tusaa.org/index.phpoption
=com content&view=category&layout=blog&id=38&Itemid=196&lang=us (last visited Oct. 1, 2010)
[hereinafter Submission Registry 2008], and Registry of Citizen Submissions 2009), SECRETARIAT FOR ENVTL
MATTERS [SEMI, http://www.tusaa.org/index.php?option=com-content&view=category&layout= blog&id=39
&Itemid=197&lang=us (last visited Oct. 1, 2010), and Registry of Citizen Submissions 2010, SECRETARIAT FOR
ENVTL. MATTERS [SEM], http://www.tusaa.org/index.php?option=com-content&view=category&layout
=blog&id=40&Itemid=198&lang=us (last visited Oct. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Submission Registry 2010] (The
current status of the 2007 citizen submission is "preparing factual record" while no submitted cases from 2008-
2010 have reached that stage).
122. Submission Registry 2010, supra note 121.
123. Jonathan G. Dorn, NAAEC Citizen Submissions Against Mexico: An Analysis of the Effectiveness of
a Participatory Approach to Environmental Law Enforcement, 20 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 129, 145 (2007);
see Wold, supra note 5, at 237.
124. Dom, supra note 123, at 143.
125. Id. at 130, 142.
126. Submission on Enforcement Matters: Mexico, COMM'N ON ENVTL. COOPERATION, http://www.
cec.org/Page.aspPagelD=1226&ContentlD=&SiteNodelD=547&BLExpandlD= (last visited Oct. 1, 2010);
Submission on Enforcement Matters:Canada, COMM'N ON ENVTL. COOPERATION, http://www.cec.org/Page.
asp?PagelD=1226&ContentlD=&SiteNodelD=546&BLExpandlD= (last visited Oct. 2, 2010); Submission on
Enforcement Matters: United States, COMM'N ON ENVTL. COOPERATION, http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?
PagelD=1226&ContentlD=&SiteNodelD=548&BL ExpandlD= (last visited Oct. 1, 2010) (Showing that
during this period there were twenty-five submissions filed against Canada and ten filed against the United
States).
127. Dorn, supra note 123, at 138.
128. Factual Records, COMM'N ON ENvTL. COOPERATION, http://www.ted.cec.org/Page.asp?
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It is hard to label the submission process in Mexico as a full success.
Although the factual records produced have had some influence in pushing
government and private actors to publicly support strengthening environmental
laws, the results are not uniformly promising.129 Based on a submission filed in
1996, the first Mexican factual record is indicative of shortcomings of the
process, particularly under the NAAEC model." 0 Filed on behalf of three NGOs,
the submission challenged Mexico's approval of a pier to be built off of Cozumel
Island."' The pier was widely criticized by the local government and islanders
because of the severe damage it was expected to cause to two local reefs, the
Arrecife Paraiso and Cadena Arrecifal del Gran Caribe.'32 Although the factual
record indicated the Mexican government ignored scientific findings that the
reefs would be damaged in contravention of national environmental laws, it made
no conclusion as to whether Mexico violated the NAAEC or Mexican law.'
Nonetheless, some environmentalists claimed that the record was a validation
of the NGOs' claims and that the corresponding embarrassment to the Mexican
government was in itself a victory' In support of this view, the Mexican
government did undertake a new management study for Cozumel Island and
vowed to improve laws protecting coral reefs.13 However, no subsequent laws
have been enacted to prevent development in protected coral reef areas. 136Many
also viewed the failure of the factual record to make binding recommendations or
halt eventual construction of the pier (used for large cruise ships) as proof that
the submission process was merely an arm of a toothless and powerless
bureaucracy.
Despite the mixed success of the Cozumel case, two factual records clearly
pushed private and government actors to mitigate their activities affecting the
PagelD-924&SiteNodelD--543 (last visited Oct. 1, 2010) (Lists factual records to date); Environmental Pollution in
Hermosillo II, COMM'N ON ENVTL. COOPERATION, http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PagelD-2001&ContentlD=
2395&SiteNodelD=559&BLExpandlD- (last visited Oct. 10, 2010); Ex Hacienda El Hospital II, COMM'N ON
ENvTL. COOPERATION, http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PagelD-2001&ContentlD=2400&Site NodelD=560&BL
ExpandlD- (last visited Oct. 10, 2010); Ex Hacienda El Hospital III, COMM'N ON ENVTL. COOPERATION,
http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PagelD-2001&ContentlD-2400&SiteNodelD-547&BLExpandlD= (last visited Oct.
10, 2010); Transgenic Maize in Chihuahua, COMM'N ON ENVTL. COOPERATION, http://www.cec
.org/Page.asp?PagelD-2001&ContentlD-2411&SiteNodelD-563&BLExpandlD- (last visited Oct. 10, 2010);
Wetlands in Manzanillo, COMM'N ON ENvTL. COOPERATION, http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PagelD-2001&
ContentlD-2412&SiteNodelD-563&BLExpandlD- (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
129. See Dom, supra note 123, at 130-39 (outlining six factual records-some that have been quite
successful and some that have-not in Mexico).
130. Paul Stanton Kibel, The Paper Tiger Awakens: North American Environmental Law After the
Cozumel Reef Case, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 395, 420 (2001).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 469.
134. Id. at 469-70.
135. Id. at 470.
136. See id.
137. Id. at 470-71.
354
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 23
environment.'1' The factual record and corresponding publicity related to the
Aquanova shrimp farm in San Blas (1996) prompted that company to take
numerous steps to reverse its destruction of mangrove ecosystems in the area.
The factual record in the case arose after the company diverted water from by
mangrove swamps for use in nearby shrimp farms, which diverted navigation
routes used by local fishermen and polluted the surrounding water.'" While
Aquanova has not stopped pumping wastewater directly into the ocean, it has
taken measures to reforest damaged mangrove wetlands and limited its scale of
development in response to the factual record.14' The local government has also
become more receptive to environmental concerns in the area, with the municipal
government of San Blas using tax revenues to fund local environmental
projects.142
In 1998, another submission was made in relation to a failed government
cleanup of a lead smelter in Tijuana.143 The results that followed also demonstrate
the capabilities of the citizen submission process.'" When a factual record was
made public in 2002, the Mexican government was initially slow to address
findings outlining its failed cleanup of hazardous industrial waste left by a U.S.
battery company. 14' However, by 2004 an agreement was reached with local and
national authorities establishing a comprehensive five-year cleanup of the site in
question.146 This plan involves various tests of the site, the creation of a technical
workgroup to assist in the cleanup process, a guarantee of accountability to the
community, and cooperation with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.147
Beyond these two successes, three additional factual records have had more
ambiguous results. For example, after the 1996 Cozumel submission, a factual
record resulted from a submission alleging that the Mexican government failed to
regulate dumping of wastewater into the Magdalena River.148 Despite a record
establishing that the Mexican government permitted violations of national and
Sonora state environmental laws, no information has been released showing that
138. See COMM'N FOR ENvTL. COOPERATION OF N. AM., FACTUAL RECORD: AQUANOVA SUBMISSION
(SEM-98-006) (2003), http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/SEM/98-6-FR-E.pdf; Mega Tourism and Shrimp Farming,
MANGROVE ENVTL. PROT. GRP, http://elmanglarsanblas.com/history.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2010) [hereinafter
MANGROVE]; see Rio Magdalena, COMM'N ON ENVTL. COOPERATION, http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?
PagelD=2001&ContentlD=2350&SiteNodelD=543&BLExpandlD= (last visited Mar. 6, 2011) [hereinafter
Rio Magdalena].
139. MANGROVE, supra note 138.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Dorn, supra note 123, at 134; id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 135.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Rio Magdalena, supra note 138.
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the company has taken any steps to come into compliance with those laws.'49
Two remaining factual records, one relating to the release of sulfur dioxide from
a factory in Sonora and another related to the failure to protect resources in the
Sierra Tarahumara Mountains in Chihuahua, are also difficult to gauge in terms
of effectiveness.'50
The fact that only a few overall submissions have been developed into
factual records is one source of concern about the effectiveness of the process,
indicating that the procedure is tilted against the submitter."' Also, the fact that
all but one of the Mexican submissions leading to a factual record were filed by
NGOs may indicate that the submission process is too complicated, time
consuming, and expensive for average citizens in the developing world.1
Despite these limitations, the initial experience under DR-CAFTA has been
promising. Originally filed on May 9, 2007, on behalf of the Humane Society
International against the Dominican Republic,' the first DR-CAFTA submission
alleged a failure by the Dominican government to enforce its domestic laws
protecting endangered sea turtles. As a result, various ornaments, jewelry and
other products made from the turtles were sold in open markets.' After the
Humane Society initially failed to meet the submission requirements calling for a
response from the government, a revised submission was eventually found to be
sufficient.' Strikingly, in response to this request the Dominican government
took decisive action before a factual record was required.' 7 After a widespread
government effort aimed at educating consumers and encouraging use of
alternate materials, there was a ninety-nine percent reduction in the amount of
these goods being sold.' t
Two DR-CAFTA submissions from 2008 also filed against the Dominican
149. Dorn, supra note 123, at 133.
150. Id. at 135-37 (describing that in the submission relating to sulfur dioxide in Sonora the polluter is
"likely" to take "corrective action," and that in the Chihuahua factual record, it is difficult to determine the
effectiveness of that factual record because of widespread publicity unrelated to the factual record).
151. Dom, supra note 123, at 138-39 (noting that, in addition to a disappointing amount of factual
records, the average time between submission and publication of factual record in Mexico is a lengthy fifty-
three months, and indicating that the submitter is kept in the dark as to the accuracy of the "challenged Party's
response").
152. Id. The most recent factual record was filed by an individual submitter. ALCA-Iztapalapa II,
COMM'N ON ENVTL. COOPERATION, http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PagelD=2001&ContentlD=2383&SiteNode
ID=557&BLExpandlD= (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
153. CAFTA-DR Secretariat for Environmental Matters [SEMI, Sea Turtles - Determination Article
17.7.2 & 17.7.4, at 1, SAA/CAALA07001 (Dec. 5, 2007), http://cabrera-verde.org/files/Determinacion
OriginalEng.pdf [hereinafter Sea Turtles].
154. Id. at 1-2.
155. Id. at 2.
156. Id. at 1.
157. Processes and Education, CAFTA-DR ENVTL. COOPERATION, http://www.caftadr-environ
ment.org/top-menu/activities/A/PublicParticipation/Processes_&-Education.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2010).
158. Press Release, Lee Poston, World Wildlife Federation, Turtles no Longer Turn to Souvenirs in
Dom. Rep., (Mar. 25, 2009), http://www.worldwildlife.org/who/media/press/2009/WWFPresiteml 1966.html.
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Republic" 9 had similarly promising results. Both alleged a failure by the
government to stop illegal sand removal from the north coast of the country in
contravention of domestic environmental law.'" Within months after the
submissions were filed, with cooperation from various government officials
towards putting an end to the illegal practice, the two submitters were able to end
the sand extractions.1' As a result of this success, both submissions were
withdrawn in 2009.162
These successes in the Dominican Republic along with the mixed success of
the Mexican factual records highlight both the positive impact that submissions
have had but also their limitations. A successful record or submission can lead to
a significant change of course by government and private actors. Nonetheless, as
the Mexican experience highlights, a minority of submissions overall have
developed into factual records. 16 In a number of these cases, the results have not
been universally strong.'6"
Until more submissions play out in the remaining DR-CAFTA countries, it is
difficult to fully assess the process under that agreement. Whether the five year
follow up required by both the CTPA and PTPA will make the process more
effective has yet to be seen. The cumbersome submission process also fails to
proactively address the scale effects that have been shown to overcome weak
environmental institutions in the developing world. The increased environmental
costs that arose in Mexico after NAFTA seem to indicate that a more aggressive
approach that addresses known shortcomings in environmental infrastructure
may be necessary. The PTPA Annex on Forest Sector Governance represents a
move to such an approach.165
VII. A PROMISING DEVELOPMENT: THE U.S.-PERU TPA AND THE FOREST
SECTOR ANNEX
As the most recent free trade agreement ratified between the U.S. and Latin
America, the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA) makes strides
towards mitigating scale effects, and tailoring the agreement to address the
unique environmental issues facing Peru.'6 Peru's wealth of mahogany and weak
159. Submission Registry 2008, supra note 121.
160. Letter from Jorge Mauricio Guzman Valdez, Gen. Coordinator, CAFTA-DR Secretariat for Envtl.





163. Dom, supra note 123, at 138.
164. See id. at 132-39 (outlining the mixed results of the factual records laid out above, particularly in
the Rio Magdalena and Cozumel pier cases).
165. Wold, supra note 5, at 247-48.
166. See id. Scale effects refer to the causal relationships between economic growth and development
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enforcement of its environmental laws subjects its forest ecosystems to largely
unmitigated environmental pressures.'6 ' The problem has reached such an extent
that ninety-five percent of mahogany logging in the country now occurs
illegally.6  Despite rampant illegality in the timber industry, not a single
commercial logger has been imprisoned as of 2006.169 Flagrant and obvious
violations are common, with many loggers cutting trees in rainforest preserves
and parks designed to protect local ecosystems.170
Although these facts are troubling, Peru still has relatively low deforestation
rates of 0.035 to 0.5 percent annually.' 7' However, along with increasing
development comes increasing pressure. Increased investment in gold mining,
energy development (including a massive coal deal with China), road building,
cocoa farming, and cattle grazing all serve to heighten the level of deforestation
in Peru. 72
Seeking to address the enforcement problems mentioned above, the PTPA
breaks from the mold of the NAAEC and DR-CAFTA and addresses the
Peruvian situation uniquely. 3 By including more of the 2007 recommendations
by the U.S. House Ways and Means Committee, 174 the Annex on Forest Sector
Governance (the Annex) implements several binding requirements on the
Peruvian government.1
Within eighteen months after the PTPA came into effect on February 1,
2009, the Annex requires that Peru take various steps to improve enforcement of
its forestry laws.76 These steps include an increase in the number of personnel
devoted to forest law enforcement, an anti-corruption plan for officials dealing
with forest administration, and an increase in criminal penalties related to the
harvest of forest products.'"
and environmental impacts. Environment and Trade, supra note 16. The agreement is in part intended to
safeguard against negative environmental impacts resulting from economic growth in Peru. See PTPA, supra
note 28, art. 18.1.
167. FILLIPo DEL GATTo ET. AL., TRADE LiBERALIZATION AND FOREST VERIFICATION: LEARNING FROM THE
U.S.-PERU TRADE PROMOTION AGREEMENT 2 (2009), http://www.verifor.org/RESOURCES/briefing-papers/9-
perutradeliberalisation.pdf.






173. Wold, supra note 5, at 247-48; see U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement: Benefiting the
Environment Through Improved Forest Sector Governance, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (July
2007), http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/perulasset-upload-file20i13228.pdf.
174. See WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 26 (laying out the recommendations to strengthen the
environmental provisions in the PTPA to be included in the Annex).
175. DEL GATTO ET AL., supra note 167, at 1.
176. PTPA, supra note 28, Annex 18.3.4 para. 3.
177. Id. Annex 18.3.4 para. 3(a)-(b).
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In failing to enforce its own forestry laws, Peru also failed to meet its
obligations under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), a multilateral treaty that seeks to protect
endangered species from extinction due to trade.' In response, the Annex
requires that Peru implement policies to monitor tree species listed under
CITES.'"9 Peru must also physically inspect areas designated for extraction of
trees listed under CITES before approving an annual operating plan, and produce
a public report with the results.'80 The country is also required to "[d]evelop and
implement timber-tracking systems to verify the legal origin and chain of custody
of all CITES-listed timber species." Peru is also obligated to improve the
management of its forest concessions, take into account the views of NGOs and
indigenous communities, establish an agency to verify timber concessions,
identify a government agency as a focal point to investigate violations of laws
and regulations, support community-based forest management, and appropriately
identify protected areas and concessions.18 2
While Peru's duties are highly proactive, the U.S.' responsibilities are mostly
cooperative and focus on institution building.'83 For example, the United States
commits to work with Peru to strengthen the legal, policy, and institutional
framework of the forest sector; build institutional capacity for forest law
enforcement; improve performance of the forest concession system; and increase
public participation in forest resource planning and management decision-
making.184 To ensure that Peru is meeting its responsibilities under the agreement,
Peru is to conduct both periodic and randomly requested audits by the United
States.'85 After receiving a written request from the U.S., Peru must conduct an
audit of the specifically listed producer or exporter to ensure it is following
Peru's forestry laws.' 8
The agreement also allows the U.S. to seek verification that particular
shipments of timber into the U.S. have complied with timber laws. 18 In response
to such a request, Peruvian officials are required to visit the exporter or producer,
and if requested, allow a U.S. official to accompany them.' The officials must
178. DEL GATTO ET AL., supra note 167, at 2-4; see Discover CITES: What is CITES?, CONVENTION ON
INT'L TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FLORA AND FAUNA, http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/what.shtml
(last visited Mar. 6, 2011).
179. DEL GATrO ET AL., supra note 167, at 3.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. PTPA, supra note 28, Annex 18.3.4, para. 3(a)(i), 3(h)(i)-(iv), 3(j).
183. See id. Annex 18.3.4, paras. 7-15 (laying out the Peru's responsibilities ensuring that Peru is
enforcing timber laws, as well as measures the U.S. will take to strengthen Peru's environmental enforcement).
184. Id. Annex 18.3.4, para. 4.
185. Id. Annex 18.3.4, para. 6(a) n.16.
186. Id. Annex 18.3.4, para. 6(b).
187. Id. Annex 18.3.4, para. 7.
188. Id. Annex 18.3.4, para. 10.
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then prepare a report within forty-five days based on their visit to the enterprise
and its inspection of the business' documentation of compliance.'89 Based on this
report, the U.S. can choose to deny entry of the shipment involved, or if an
enterprise has knowingly provided false information to either country's officials,
the U.S. can reject all timber products of that enterprise listed in CITES.'"
There are also new institutional creations under the Annex. The parties are to
create a Sub-Committee on Forest Sector Governance under the Committee on
Trade in Goods and the Environmental Affairs Council created by the
agreement.'9' The parties are to "consult regularly . . . and shall exchange
appropriate, non-confidential information on bilateral trade in timber products,"' 92
such as information on efforts to fight illegal logging associated with trade,
implementation of requirements under CITES, and other relevant information.'93
In addressing the unique environmental pressures likely to result from
increased foreign access to Peru's mahogany forests, the PTPA takes an
important step away from the one-size-fits-all approach of prior trade
agreements. '"4 Although the current share of foreign investment in Peru's timber
industry is low,'95 the fact that Mexico experienced a fourfold increase in exports
and imports with America after NAFTA would seem to foreshadow an upward
trend in Peru.'96 The U.S. is currently the largest trading partner with Peru,
accounting for twenty percent of all trade there,'97 and the increased freedom and
protection for U.S. investors will surely bolster this relationship.
The PTPA Forest Sector Annex represents an important step towards
mitigating the overwhelming effect that the rush of trade and investment can
have on regulatory mechanisms within developing countries.'" The capability of
U.S. authorities to call for an inspection and bar the entry of individual timber
shipments and the firms that send them serves to hit companies directly at their
bottom line. Also, the Annex calls for better enforcement of its environmental
laws in general, and therefore holds the promise of improving environmental
189. Id. Annex 18.3.4, para. 12.
190. Id. at Annex 18.3.4, para. 13(a)(ii). The U.S. must correspondingly drop these restrictions at the
end of a period it specifies or if Peru submits proof that the enterprise is complying with all of the nation's
environmental laws. Id. Annex 18.3.4, para. 13(a)(ii).
191. Id. Annex 18.3.4, para. 16.
192. Id. Annex 18.3.4, para. 17.
193. Id.
194. See Wold, supra note 5, at 234-35.
195. Peru Profile, supra note 168.
196. See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trading Representative, U.S.-Mexican Officials Meet to
Discuss NAFTA (Jan. 1, 2008), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2008/january/us-821 1-
mexican-officials-meet-discuss-nafta.
197. See The World Factbook: Peru Economy, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pe.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2009).
198. Wold, supra note 5, at 247-48; SCOrr VAUGHN & GREG BLOCK, COMM'N FOR ENvTL. COOPERATION
OF N. AM., FREE TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE PICTURE BECOMES CLEARER 4 (2002),
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/ECONOMYIFreeTrade-en-fin.pdf [hereinafter VAUGHN & BLOCK].
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protection against all illegal logging, not just that related to U.S. trade. The focus
on strengthening environmental institutions in Peru is also promising. To a
certain extent, this may help fill the void left by the empty promise of an
automatic improvement in environmental quality as trade barriers are reduced
and supposedly improve standards of living.'99
However, the scope of improvements in the PTPA is also limited. The
Annex's focus on the harvesting and trade of timber products fails to address
other industries that are likely to cause environmental harm in Peru. 2m For
example, Peru recently granted the China National Petroleum Corporation rights
to search for oil in 3.7 million acres of Peru's most ecologically sensitive areas.201
The Annex' focus on tree exports fails to address the mining industry that is
heavily reliant on environmentally destructive procedures, such as blasting and
use of heavy machinery, which leads to increased mercury contamination of
Peru's rivers as the byproducts of these operations are carried downstream.202
Like Colombia, Peru has shown some capability in enforcing its national
laws against the pressures exerted by trade related industries. For example, the
government of Peru recently expelled the U.S. mining company Doe Run for
failing to clean up its La Oroya mining operation, listed in 2007 as the sixth most
polluted site in the world.203 However, the extent of pollution that was allowed to
occur before the company was expelled is staggering. Before the plant was shut
down, air quality in the town of La Oroya was measured to have eighty-five
times more arsenic, forty-one percent more cadmium, and thirteen times more
lead than is safe.204 The water supply to the town contains fifty percent more lead
than recommended by the World Health Organization. 25 The nearby Mantaro
River has been contaminated with various other pollutants such as copper, iron,
manganese, lead, and zinc, making it unsuitable for irrigation or consumption by
*206
animals.
199. VAUGHN & BLOCK, supra note 198, at 2-4.
200. Peru Profiling, supra note 168 (describing environmental degradation from sources like oil
development and gold mining in addition to logging).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. U.S. Firm Kicked Out of Peru Mining Group for Pollution, FRANCE 24, (Jan. 30, 2010),
http://www.france24.com/en/20100130-us-firm-kicked-out-peru-mining-group-pollution [hereinafter Kicked
Out].
204. Hugh O'Shaughnessy, Poisoned City Fights to Save its Children: Families in a Peruvian Valley
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Unsurprisingly, there are heightened mental and physical disabilities among
the children of La Oroya.20' Children are born with dangerously high levels of
lead in their blood, inherited from their mothers.208 The situation has reached the
point where ninety-nine percent of children in the town have unhealthy levels of
lead in their blood.29 While some of this pollution occurred before Doe Run
purchased the mines in La Oroya, the company repeatedly failed to meet clean-
up benchmarks set by Peru that were required with its purchase of the mines.2"o
The company was able to do so by manipulating the townspeople to side with it
for several years to prevent the country from forcing compliance with its
environmental laws.21' Doe Run did this using threats that the local people would
lose their jobs and livelihoods if efforts to reduce pollution were made which
212
might force the company to leave.
The fact that the pollution was already well-known and documented by
various NGOs shows that the embarrassment caused to the Peruvian government
and Doe Run was not enough to force them to comply with environmental laws
in the face of the company's manipulations. 2 ' An extension of the same type of
concrete oversight measures in the Annex could mitigate harm caused in
industries like Doe Run's, at least for businesses participating in trade with the
U.S. Another potential problem with the PTPA and the Annex on Forest Sector
Governance is that while the Annex calls for wide measures for improving Peru's
environmental law enforcement, the burden of paying for these improvements
falls solely on Peru.214
On its face, this hurts the reciprocal nature of the trade agreement (by placing
the financial onus on Peru), an attribute said to be an important element of
215
effective internationally binding agreements. A sense of reciprocity can lead to
reduced sensitivity about external interference and encourage compliance with
the Annex.216 It is argued that reciprocity is implicit in the agreement, with the
corresponding increase in national revenues resulting from the agreement
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. The World's Worst Polluted Places: The Top Ten of the Dirty Thirty, THE BLACKSMITH INSTIT., 20
(Sept. 2007), http://www.blacksmithinstitute.org/wwpp2007/finalRepor2007.pdf [hereinafter The Dirty Thirty].
210. Kicked Out, supra note 203 (describing the Doe Run's failure to adhere to the benchmarks set by
Peru, and that it acquired the mine in 1997); see id. at 20-21 (noting the struggles that doe run has had meeting
environmental guidelines and that pollution has occurred at the facility since 1992).
211. See O'Shaughnessy, supra note 204.
212. Id.
213. Id. (indicating that the Blacksmith Institute and the World Health Organization have documented
the pollution).
214. See PTPA, supra note 28, Annex 18.3.4 paras. 3-4; see also DEL GATTO ET AL., supra note 167, at
4.
215. DEL GATrO ET AL., supra note 167, at 4.
216. Id.
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sufficient to offset the cost of these measures. 217 However, as the Mexican
experience shows, the increase in national revenues may not be substantial
enough to warrant these expenditures. In fact the Commission on Environmental
Cooperation (CEC) under NAFTA has documented little indication to support the
idea that increased revenues from trade will boost environmental enforcement
218
resources.
VIII. THE EFFECTS OF FREE TRADE AND THE "RESOURCE CURSE" THEORY
Free trade agreements can exacerbate structural social and environmental
problems in developing nations. This assertion is supported by looking at
Mexico, where after NAFTA, poverty has deepened in the years since it was
drafted.219 As already mentioned, this has occurred while the cost of
environmental degradation has reached a significant percentage of Mexico's
GDP.220 To some extent this may be due to a lack of institutional funding to study
and develop plans to address the environmental effects of trade.221
Despite a gross trade value of $305.5 billion in 2009 between the U.S. and
Mexico, NAFTA's Commission on Environmental Cooperation (CEC) has had a
budget of only $9 million.222 Therefore, it is not altogether surprising that the
CEC has been unable to reduce environmental damage more effectively.223 This
also highlights the need for greater proportional funding for the Environmental
Affairs Council (EAC) and the Environmental Cooperation Commission (ECC)
under the CTPA than was afforded the CEC under NAFTA. The fact that under
DR-CAFTA, environmental projects are funded by a significantly higher budget,
with funding set at $18.5 million and $19.3 million for 2006 and 2007,
respectively, is a promising trend that should be continued.224 The potential
impact of increased investment directed at specific environmental issues was
made evident in 2008, when Peru's environmental minister stated that for $20
million in foreign aid per year, Peru could reach zero deforestation within a
decade.225
217. Id.
218. Wold, supra note 5, at 225.
219. Gallagher, supra note 7, at 12.
220. Id.
221. See Wold, supra note 5, at 244-46.
222. Trade with Mexico: 2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/foreign-tradelbalance/
c2010.html#2009 (last visited Feb. 12, 2010); Wold, supra note 5, at 243; see also David L. Markell, The North
American Commission for Environmental Cooperation After Ten Years: Lessons About Institutional Structure
and Public Participation in Governance, 26 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 341, 347 n.39 (2004).
223. See Markell, supra note 222 (comparing the CEC's $9 million budget to protect the environment
across North America to the much larger budget of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency).
224. See Wold, supra note 5, at 243.
225. James Painter, Peru Aims for Zero Deforestation, BBC NEWS (Dec. 7, 2008), http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hil7768226.stm.
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Although it calls for a much more expansive relationship with newly
incorporated nations, the European Union spends about ten times more in its
development funds than the United States spends on grants to Latin America.226
The effectiveness of pairing this commitment along with lowered trade barriers is
supported by experiences in Spain, Ireland, and Greece, all of which saw better
social and environmental conditions after entering the European Union.227
Assisting developing nations to invest in improved enforcement and institutions
is especially important when new trade agreements first come into effect.228
According to NAFTA's CEC, the "effectiveness of environmental regulations is
of pivotal importance, especially during transitional periods when countries open
markets to international competition, streamline regulations and standards to
reduce administrative costs, and move to restructure markets through the
deregulation of competition policies."229
Experience has shown that resource rich nations with poor environmental
institutions and enforcement are often harmed in the long run when trade
liberalization leads to increased focus on natural resource exports. 23 0 This
experience, coined the "resource curse," creates a situation whereby focusing on
natural resource exports instead of developing more advanced industries such as
manufacturing, these developing countries do not advance technologically.23'
This is particularly true in tropical nations like Colombia that are rich in oil and
232
mineral resources. As what are called "point resources" such as minerals and
energy become more profitable, they account for greater percentages of the
national economy at the expense of growth in non-resource intensive industries.233
Eventually, as specialization in the resource sector grows in conjunction with
higher interest rates, this leads to lower levels of capital and production in non-
tradable sectors of the economy, causing a severe reduction in overall welfare in
234the country. Acknowledging the structural economic causes of the "resource
curse" model above, many argue that declining development and welfare in
resource rich countries cannot be explained without also looking to weak
institutional and political infrastructures in those countries.235
226. Gallagher, supra note 7, at 12.
227. Id.
228. VAUGHN & BLOcK, supra note 198, at 3-4.
229. Id. at 3.
230. Edward B. Barbier, Trade, Natural Resources and Developing Countries, in HANDBOOK ON TRADE
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 71, 71-74 (Kevin P. Gallagher ed., 2008).
231. Id.at73-74.
232. See id.; see also Colombia Profile, supra note 21 (discussing Colombia's gold mining industry on
the pacific coast); see also Chris Kraul, Colombia's Oil Production is Gushing, Los ANGELES TIMES (May 12,
2010), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/12/business/la-fi-colombia-oil-20100512 (establishing
Colombia's status as an oil-producing country).
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These political and institutional shortcomings are problematic when
abundance in mineral, energy and timber sectors, along with windfall commodity
booms and discovery of valuable new reserves of these recourses encourage
fierce private competition.236 This increased competition leads to greater pressure
on policy-makers.237 In states with weak political and legal institutions,
governments are susceptible to being overrun, allowing distorted natural resource
management and economic policies that favor the companies vying for natural
resources. 23R Tnus, any new approach in the CTPA should accompany the already
existing provisions making sure that environmental laws are enforced and
upheld.239
The impact of increased national focus on resource intensive trade can also
be linked to another major environmental problem in developing countries: the
widespread conversion of rainforest to subsistence agricultural land.240
Conversion of sensitive forest areas into subsistence agricultural land has been
found to correlate with decreasing GDP per capita and poverty.241 Thus, as
unregulated and unsustainable growth in resource-dependent industries leads to a
decrease in overall welfare, an increase in poverty occurs, and the impoverished
increasingly turn to subsistence farming as a last resort.242
Whether or not it occurs in all instances, the "resource curse" theory marks a
total contrast to the idea promoted by some free trade advocates that open
markets will automatically bring improved living standards and improved
environmental standards. 243 It also reinforces the idea that the limited enforcement
based approach of the NAAEC and DR-CAFTA, and CTPA fails to cope with a
reality that requires a more proactive approach to deeper environmental threats. 24
For these reasons, enhanced commitments to environmental infrastructure and
focused enforcement objectives like those included in the Annex on Forest Sector
Governance to the PTPA should be added to the CTPA.
IX. APPLYING THESE LESSONS TO THE CTPA
After taking into account that the most pressing environmental harm caused
by liberalized trade results from increased resource exploitation overrunning
236. Id. at 75.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See Wold, supra note 5, at 244.
240. Id. at 76.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Compare Gallagher, supra note 7, at 2-4 (discussing the argument made by some trade advocates
that trade liberalization will lead to economic growth and environmental protection in developing countries),
with Barbier, supra note 230 (discussing "the resource curse" theory where increased trade in natural resources
harms developing countries).
244. Wold, supra note 5, at 234.
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lacking environmental institutions, the CTPA should focus on remedying existing
institutional shortcomings. This seems particularly important considering the
civil conflict in Colombia, along with the difficulties the country already faces in
enforcing its environmental laws. While the citizen submission process was a
positive addition when it was inserted into the NAAEC and other subsequent
agreements, it is insufficient to mitigate the environmental effects of trade
liberalization with the United States.2 45 The 2007 extension of dispute
mechanisms available for other essential parts of the PTPA and CTPA was
promising but it is hard to see how this will address the more deeply rooted
structural environmental problems in Colombia.246 This seems especially true
considering that similar dispute settlement measures have never been invoked
under the NAAEC or any other free trade agreements with the United States.247
USAID has already bolstered sustainable development through a bilateral
debt reduction agreement creating the Fondo Para la Accidn Ambiental (FPAA)
funded by $41.6 million in interest accrued through USAID debt.248 The FPAA
seeks to boost sustainable development at the community level by funding non-
governmental organizations. 249 To mitigate the environmental pressures that will
likely grow due to increased trade and investment under the CTPA, the roles of
the EAC and ECC in studying and addressing the effects of trade should be
enhanced. Their insight can be integral in understanding how the export focused
development of the Pacific region can be implemented and regulated in a more
sustainable way, just as the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC)
has been an important (albeit limited) factor in mitigating environmental harm
under NAFTA.250
Like Peru, Colombia faces deforestation driven by trade related industries,
including logging and illegal deforestation.251 Therefore, the CTPA should
incorporate a similarly tailored and country specific approach to promote
protection of endangered tree species and avoidance of illegal deforestation as
that incorporated in the Peruvian agreement. Since illegal logging is not the only
significant threat to forests and environmental quality, an effort should be made
to address mining and other heavy industries taking part in U.S.-bound trade as
well.
245. Id. at 232, 237-38.
246. See id. at 234, 236.
247. In fact, the use of a similar government sanctions provisions under the NAAEC has been
discouraged in formal recommendations to the Parties to the agreement. Id. at 236.
248. Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) Program Description, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV.,
http://www.usaid.gov/our-work/environment/forestry/eai-descs.html (last updated Aug. 15, 2006).
249. Id.
250. Wold, supra note 5, at 216, 225-27.
251. Colombia Profile, supra note 21 (describing various trade related industries as being responsible
for deforestation); Peru Profile, supra note 168 (indicating that Peru faces increasing deforestation from
economic development).
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Through Plan Colombia, USAID has already invested $1.3 billion largely in
anti-narcotics measures and efforts to end civil conflict.252 As already mentioned,
some of these measures have added to deforestation levels while having little
effect on cocaine exportation.253 Because of the correlation between deforestation
and climate change,254 the U.S. national interest in preventing climate change and
its potentially devastating effects also presents an argument for increased
investment to combat deforestation under the CTPA. Improvements to the
environmental provisions of the CTPA might thus be an effective way to promote
another important American interest comparable to combating drugs.
X. CONCLUSION
Experience has proven some free trade advocates incorrect in their prediction
that increased trade would automatically correlate with increased prosperity and
increased environmental standards. Instead of applying the same basic language
from prior agreements, the final draft of the CTPA should include strengthened
environmental provisions. Recent changes to the CTPA subjecting its
environmental provisions to the binding dispute resolution portion of the
agreement were a step in the right direction, but the fact that similar provisions in
prior trade agreements have never been used creates doubts as to their
effectiveness. To address known and existing environmental threats, the CTPA
should also adopt a nuanced country and issue specific approach with binding
enforcement measures exemplified by the PTPA Forest Sector Annex. Efforts
should also be made to extend these measures beyond the logging industry alone.
To enhance the effectiveness of the citizen submission process, an effort should
be made to make the citizen submission process more fair and accessible to
average citizens and also to re-incorporate the independent oversight originally
allowed for under the NAAEC through the secretariat and the JPAC.
Lastly, to address scale effects from trade, the trend of increased investment
in environmental projects for the ECC and EAC under the CTPA should
continue, and should be accompanied by increased investment in environmental
institutions and protections in Colombia. These institutions play a vital role in the
study and implementation of plans to reduce the harmful environmental impacts
of reduced trade and investment barriers with the United States. They are also
needed to counterbalance weaknesses in the domestic Colombian environmental
enforcement infrastructure.
252. Colombia, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L. DEV., http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cbj2002/lac/co/ (last updated
Feb. 12, 2003).
253. See supra Part Ell; Colombia Profile, supra note 21.
254. See Rhett A. Butler, Atmospheric Role of Forests, MONGABAY, http://rainforests.mongabay
.com/0907.htm (last updated Mar. 07, 2011).
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More than a decade of experience in Mexico indicates that even with
increased revenues from trade, little of this revenue will likely be put towards
environmental protection.255 In a modem age where environmental problems like
climate change and species extinction have global causes and implications, it
seems short-sighted and injurious not to adopt new approaches in a trade
agreement with one of the world's most biologically diverse nations. Economic
development is important, but so too is a balance of interests sufficient to protect
vital natural resources and a safe environment for future generations. These two
interests can go hand in hand. The NAAEC model upon which the CTPA, and
the other post NAFTA agreements have been built is too limited an approach
towards that goal.
255. Wold, supra note 5, at 225.
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